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Let’s Talk About Emotions1
Dina Mendonça
Abstract: This paper testiﬁes the crucial importance of 
Philosophy for Children for Emotional Growth. It begins by 
establishing the open ended character of emotional processes, 
showing how feminist philosophers have criticized the ﬁxed 
conception of negative valence of certain emotions, and 
how, ultimately, the normative structure of emotions is open 
to modiﬁcation. Then, it shows how talking about emotional 
processes and emotional situations can foster emotional 
growth once we understand that the acquisition of language 
and emotional vocabulary is one way to best capture the open-
ended character of emotions. Finally, attention is turned to 
Philosophy for Children. Taking as an illustration the emotion 
of hope and its importance to inquiry, the paper concludes by 
examining in what way P4C both beneﬁts and reinforces the 
previous insights about emotion theory. 
Introduction
Talking and writing about emotions is an exciting matter. The amazing development of research on emotions is a proof that such a topic can be taken 
seriously. No doubt the rise of the study of emotions is 
partly due to feminist philosophers who have, among 
other things, placed emotions and emotional processes in 
the center of various philosophical debates. 
In this paper I want to focus on the fact that there is an 
aspect of such development that is liberating: I can talk, 
think, research on emotions! Wow! I want to show that 
the liberating feeling that accompanies the possibility of 
the study of emotion is at the center of emotional reality 
itself: for there is a sense in which emotions are open 
ended entities. This open-ended character of emotional 
processes means that they are open to modiﬁcation, 
to re-creation, and that talking about them, fortiﬁes 
the continuing lively transformation of our emotional 
world. 
The contribution of feminist philosophers is 
fundamental to appreciate the lively openness of 
emotions. Therefore, I begin the paper by showing the 
way feminist philosophers have criticized the ﬁxed 
conception of negative valence of certain emotions, 
and ultimately showing that the normative structure of 
emotions is open to modiﬁcation. Then, I explain how 
understanding acquisition of language and emotional 
vocabulary best captures the open-ended character of 
emotions, and how talking about emotional processes 
and emotional situations fosters emotional growth. 
Finally, I turn my attention to Philosophy for Children 
seeing in what way Philosophy for Children both beneﬁts 
and reinforces the previous insights, and how its practice 
provides opportunities to explore the dynamic nature of 
emotions. In order to show how Philosophy for Children 
is a crucial element for emotional education, I take up the 
emotional process of hope as an illustration of the impact 
of dialogue for emotional development. I conclude by 
pointing to several suggestions for future inquiry in the 
fruitful connection of Feminist Philosophy, Philosophy 
for Children and Philosophy of Emotions. 
 
Feminist Philosophy: Negative emotions  
and their meaning
Despite the common sense belief that women are 
more emotional and more emotionally expressive than 
men, the contribution of feminist philosophy for the 
topic of emotion is not due to that mistaken interpretation 
of gender reality. What studies show is that males and 
females express emotions differently (Simon & Nath 
2004, 1162-3), though they do not necessarily differ in 
the experience of emotion (Simon & Nath 2004, 1142-3, 
1149-50). Nevertheless, studies also show that there are 
different expectations concerning gendered emotional 
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expression. For instance, not only women are viewed 
as feeling and expressing sadness more frequently than 
men, and men are viewed as feeling and expressing anger 
more frequently than women (Simon & Nath 2004, 1138) 
but, in addition, there is the general belief that women are 
both more emotional and more emotionally expressive 
than men (Simon & Nath 2004, 1138). As a consequence, 
women’s emotional reactions 
are overestimated, and when 
women fail to express an 
emotion which is expected 
from them, they are negatively 
evaluated (Kelly & Hutson-
Comeaux 2000, 515-517). 
This harsh reality is difﬁcult; 
not only because it stands as a 
mode of social pressure,  but 
also because it diminishes 
the importance of emotional 
reactions that lay outside of 
expectations by solidifying 
and petrifying conceptions 
and expectations about the 
world of emotions. This 
means that social conceptions 
about our emotional world 
have clear effects on the way 
we judge the appropriateness 
or inappropriateness of 
emotional displays. 
It is at the center of this 
difﬁculty that we ﬁnd one of 
the interesting contributions 
of feminist philosophy to the 
theory of emotions. Feminist philosophers have pointed 
out how social expectations about emotional processes 
format emotion evaluations, and how such evaluations 
determine and reinforce emotional processes plus their 
subsequent evaluations. Perhaps more importantly, the 
possibility of criticism by feminist philosophers makes us 
realize that this state of affairs is not eternally given, that 
is, that the norms that rule emotional expectations are not 
immutable and eternal. Feminist critique illustrates how 
it is possible to jump out of the social determination and 
reevaluate emotional processes differently, and by doing 
so, enrich our emotional world, enabling us to change 
social expectation. 
Let us look more closely at the contribution of feminist 
philosophers regarding emotion interpretation. Feminist 
philosophers re-evaluated several seemingly negative 
emotions such as anger, resentment and bitterness 
pointing out that the evaluation of emotional processes 
is formatted by social expectations and that, when one 
changes perspective, the same emotional processes can 
be seen, understood, and evaluated under a different 
light. As Bell writes, “many feminist philosophers have 
argued that emotions traditionally considered immoral 
or detrimental should be 
considered moral or political 
accomplishments when they 
are felt by women within a 
context of male domination” 
(Bell 2005, 80). 
In  “A Woman’s Scorn: 
Towards a Feminist Defense 
of Contempt as a Moral 
Emotion”, Bell makes 
an insightful summary 
of the reasons by which 
negative emotions can be 
seen positively. First, some 
feminists have argued that 
the negative emotions are 
ways by which women try 
to refuse and ﬁght social 
norms and constraints. In 
this way, negative emotions 
have been seen and praised 
for their subversive quality. 
This type of insubordination 
may be a way to sustain self-
respect (Bell 2005, 81). In 
the second place, it seems 
that these negative emotions 
have an important epistemological role because such 
emotional states directly format the epistemic position 
of the subject in a context of oppression, giving subjects 
an insightful perspective in which one can see to 
certain aspects invisible for those without those same 
states (Narayan 1988). In addition, emotions can have 
indirect epistemological import by providing a way to 
gain knowledge of the position of the subject. As Bell 
writes, “through the process of noting, analyzing, and 
categorizing circumstances in which we become angry 
and have our anger be given uptake, women can map out 
others’ conception of who and what we are (Bell 2005, 
82). Also, seemingly negative emotions can be seen as 
moral and political achievements when they are seen 
as ways to witness and testify injustice (Bell 2005, 82). 
Finally, the information given by emotional processes 
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may transform their negativity when they become means 
of initiating, maintaining and leading others to social 
change (Bell 2005, 82). 
The feminist analysis of seemingly negative emotions 
changes the meaning of valence by enlarging and showing 
the complexity of such emotional processes, and by doing 
so illustrates how feminists show that emotions’ norms are 
subject to criticism and reevaluation; and consequently to 
transformation. Given that the sense of appropriateness 
and inappropriateness of emotions lies at the base of the 
notion of rationality of emotion, it is of crucial importance 
to recognize the possibility of transformation. For if 
emotions’ norms are formatted by social expectations and 
such reality is capable of modiﬁcation, it is important to 
continue the work of revising and reevaluating the role, 
impact of various emotions, and continue to construct the 
rationality of emotions. 
Open Character of Emotions
 What the feminist critique allows us to recognize is 
that one of the missing insights from theories of emotion 
is that emotions reveals something about ourselves 
and the world, and this revelation has an impact in the 
way we will be in the future, because it may allows us 
to  transforme the colors of our emotional world. That 
is, appealling to criticize and place under the focus of 
dialogue emotional processes, and be willing to accept 
a different interpretation of them, may transform our 
engagement with emotional process themselves. An 
appeal voiced by John Cogan in “Emotion and the 
growth of consciousness. Gaining insight through a 
phenomenology of rage”. Cogan writes that when he 
appeals to engage with emotion he is in fact claiming 
that there is an alternative understanding of emotion 
provided by emotion itself (Cogan 2003, 213). There 
is something truly revealing in the eruption of emotion. 
Cogan writes, “the eruption of emotion produces an 
awareness of enlightenment and revelation—a revelation 
that is reminiscent of the Greek word charis, meaning 
grace, a kind of divine gift. I become informed about the 
world and myself” (Cogan 2003, 223). 
What this means is that understanding the rationality 
of emotions does not mean to discover connections of 
emotional processes with the rationality already put 
forward, but that emotions embody, as an ultimate 
illustration, the dynamic relationship between others and 
myself, between the world and myself. I think this is how 
we should understand Solomon’s claim for the rationality 
of emotions. It is not simply that once emotional processes 
are interpreted that we ﬁnd their reasonableness, but 
that they are reasonable because they make explicit the 
intensity and the mode of our relationship with the world. 
Thus, when Solomon writes, “the rationality of emotions 
is a prereﬂective (or “intuitive”) logic, but one which, like 
all logics, can be brought to the surface upon reﬂection 
and rendered explicit” (Solomon 1993, 182), he is not 
claiming that the rationality of emotions is there, simply 
to be grasped as a complete and ﬁnished logic. Instead, 
it indicates that continued reﬂection upon emotional 
processes helps us to better understand the crucial 
relevance of participating in the emotional character of 
the narrative of being in the world. 
In sum, when one agrees to accept that there is a 
sense in which emotions can be adequate or inadequate, 
one must be careful to avoid the sense that such 
appropriateness is already determined and closed. For 
emotions are essentially interactive and, as Wholheim 
writes,
This interaction is embedded in the narratives 
that we associate to our emotions, and in these 
narratives, conscious or unconscious, lie the 
identities of the emotions. But we must not think 
that these narratives are stories that we can make 
up at whim or at will. They are probably as deep as 
anything that we know about ourselves (Wholheim 
1999, 224). 
Without recognizing this lively interaction, 
emotions loose their identity, and any account of their 
appropriateness or inappropriateness must incorporate 
their dynamic nature.  It is important that we allow stories 
of emotion to appear but we must avoid thinking that 
once given, these stories are ﬁnished. Otherwise, we will 
limit the life and insightfulness of emotional processes, 
and we will close the needed continuity that attunement 
with the world requires.
In sum, emotions are open-ended entities, that is, they 
are not closed and ﬁnished modes of interaction, but on 
going and moving realities. In order to truly proﬁt from 
emotional insight it is important not only to recognize 
this livelihood, but also to foster and cultivate it. 
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It is all very nice to claim that emotions are open-
ended entities but how can we aim at capturing their 
insight if they are continuing moving forces? One way 
to look into this is to inquire into the way we become 
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familiar with emotion language2. In The Rationality 
of Emotions (1987), Ronald de Sousa argues that we 
are made familiar with the vocabulary of emotion by 
association with paradigm scenarios. He writes, 
My hypothesis is this: We are made familiar with 
the vocabulary of emotion by association with 
paradigm scenarios. These are drawn ﬁrst from 
our daily life as small children and later reinforced 
by the stories, art, and culture to which we are 
exposed. Later still, in literate cultures, they are 
supplemented and reﬁned by literature. Paradigm 
scenarios involve two aspects: ﬁrst, a situation type 
providing the characteristic objects of the speciﬁc 
emotion-type (where objects can be of the various 
sorts identiﬁed in chapter 5), and second, a set of 
characteristic or “normal” responses to the situation, 
where normality is ﬁrst a biological matter and then 
very quickly becomes a cultural one  (De Sousa 
1987, 182).
I think it is accurate to state that we become acquainted 
with the vocabulary of emotion through paradigm 
scenarios, but I think the story of how these paradigms 
are drawn is more complex than de Sousa describes 
them. It is not simply that stories reinforce paradigm 
scenarios, though I’m sure that experience before story 
telling is crucial for emotional relevance of stories. 
However, I think, they also introduce new paradigms 
that are reinforced by daily life existence (or not). That 
is, stories not only point out possibilities of paradigms 
as they also increase the complexity of paradigms, and 
there is probably a creative process of building these 
paradigm scenarios that consist in articulating relevant 
intersections between stories and daily events. And only 
this explains that, as de Sousa writes, “a paradigm can 
always be challenged in the light of a wider range of 
considerations than are available when the case is viewed 
in isolation” (de Sousa 1987, 187). Consequently, part of 
understanding well this notion of paradigm scenarios is 
to understand their malleability and how they function 
as models of emotional life, just as we have models of 
molecules to understand certain chemical reactions. 
However, in order to properly understand models requires 
understanding how they are used in laboratory practices, 
and how these practices are connected to life occurrences. 
In summary, understanding well the malleability of 
paradigm scenarios is to understand that emotions are 
open-ended. Why open? First because emotions change 
impact they have “as time does by,” second because they 
are subject to multiple modes of revision, and ﬁnally 
because as emotions reveal something about ourselves 
and bring to the surface how we feel about our feelings 
and emotions, they modify the emotional tone of previous 
and directs future emotional processes.
The literature about children’s emotional growth 
points out again and again how acquisition of language 
is crucial for emotional growth (Oatley & Jenkins 1996, 
181, 187, 191, 202-203, 227). It places the question: 
why is it that becoming familiar with the vocabulary of 
emotion should be so crucial to emotional development 
itself. 
I want to propose that being able to talk about 
emotions (saying one is scared, describing situations 
of fear, identifying why we weren’t scared in similar 
situations, telling a scary story, etc.) allows us to better 
grasp, explore, and experiment paradigm scenarios, 
and consequently maintain and explore the open-
character of emotional processes. More forcefully, what 
I am suggesting is that to the dynamic understanding of 
forming paradigm scenarios (story telling and daily life 
events) we should add that dialogue is a fundamental 
part of creating that intersection, for it is the way we 
incorporates reactions of others, emotional tones of 
environments, etc. That is, language is a tool of emotional 
life that helps to modify and solidify emotional activity 
because it allows us to describe emotional situations and 
such descriptions are simultaneously revelations about 
the situations at stake. The creative participation of 
language in emotional life lies in the ability of language 
to 1) direct attention in a speciﬁc situation, 2) naming the 
salient comparisons and contrasts with other emotional 
situation, 3) be part of the group of consequences (for 
example, making it possible to say “I’m sorry”) and 
allow enumeration of different consequences, and ﬁnally 
4) allow the construction of a narrative in different ways, 
which means that somehow language is able to mimic the 
evaluative processes that underlies emotional activity. 
This last contribution of language partly explains why 
one can overcome emotional difﬁculties by talking about 
emotionally problematic events. At the same time, talking 
about such events is not sufﬁcient3, for after one uses 
language to re-created the paradigm scenario of a certain 
emotional situation one still has to return to the daily 
life and experiment living with the reassessed paradigm 
scenario. In summary, language use in the emotional 
world implies development because it can emulate the 
evaluative process that underlies emotional activity, and 
consequently, allow not only a better experimentation of 
the complex identity of paradigm scenarios but also a 
creative tool for handling emotional difﬁculties. 
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Philosophy for Children and  
Emotional Growth 
It has become more and more visible that emotional 
literacy should be promoted in schools (Kristjánsson 
2006, 53), perhaps not so clear is how such emotional 
education should be 
done, and what does 
it mean to take up 
emotional literacy. I 
think Philosophy for 
Children can have an 
important role to play 
in participating in 
emotional education. 
There are many 
ways in which one could 
show the relevance of 
Philosophy for Children 
program to foster 
emotional development 
and growth. For 
this paper, I want to 
concentrate in showing 
that Philosophy for 
Children keeps alive 
the lesson of feminist 
philosophy of aiming 
to keep at the surface 
the open character of 
emotional processes in at least two ways.  
First, Philosophy for Children fosters the open-ended 
character of emotional processes by giving, through its 
novels, situations that are capable of being explored in 
the on going dialogue of the community of inquiry. This 
provides opportunities for participants of a community 
of inquiry to listen to other descriptions of the emotional 
connotation of emotional situation as well as explore their 
own descriptions. As some developmental psychologists 
assume, the realization of the possibility of emotional 
ambivalence of situations and episodes marks an 
important step in emotional development (Harris 1989, 
109-125), and the sharing process of the community 
of inquiry is a constant place to compare and contrast 
emotions of the different participants. The practice of 
Philosophy for Children promotes the search for the sense 
of mixed emotions of situations and episodes and makes 
it part of the emotional growth of the members of the 
community. Clearly supporting the wise comment that 
different emotional realities are not  “a psychological and 
educational problem to be negotiated or overcome but, 
rather, as an avenue for emotional learning and growth” 
(Kristjánsson 2006, 51).
It is not just the case that talking about emotions in 
communities of inquiry helps participants to become 
more aware of the surrounding emotional world and 
thereby more capable of 
emotional control and 
emotional management. 
Of course, this increase 
of control is also 
desirable and the 
literature on children 
emotional development 
seems to indicate that 
language acquisition is 
determinate for emotion 
regulation. But in 
addition, dialogue about 
emotional situations 
and episodes, provides 
tools for continuing 
questioning and 
exploring the emotional 
world. For the argument 
that emotions are not 
closed entities (that is 
that emotional processes 
can be transformed, 
developed, changed 
through new emotional experiences and reﬂection) is 
necessarily connected to the conception that emotions 
are also very revealing of what is important to us and 
how to we relate to the world. If we have this in mind, 
it is very important that children’s emotional reactions 
are not denied, like when we say “Don’t cry, don’t be 
said.” Instead we must develop practices of dialogue to 
engage with children in exploring what are they feeling, 
how it is revealing. When such continuing dialogue about 
emotional processes takes place, there is an interchange 
in creating the ability to name emotional processes, and 
simultaneously cultivate the ability to make such emotion-
words sensitive to context and make them an integral part 
of the larger vocabulary of our emotional world. 
The insights provided by dialogue about emotional 
situations in Philosophy for Children are, of course, 
neither automatic nor immediate. Learning emotional 
literacy is obviously a long-term process (Kristjánsson 
2006, 54). This leads me to the second way in which I 
think Philosophy for Children lively embodies emotional 
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education. For in addition to providing situations and 
episodes through its novels, Philosophy for Children 
fosters, in its own practice, the cultivation of crucial 
emotional abilities. It is possible to illustrate this by 
showing how Philosophy for Children cultivates the 
ability to practice and learn empathy, or by showing how 
Philosophy for Children increases self-esteem, or how 
Philosophy for Children enables and develops trust, or 
how Philosophy for Children embodies the practice of 
Caring Thinking. For the present purpose of the paper 
I think it is insightful to acknowledge how Philosophy 
for Children gives rise and promotes hope because the 
sentiment of hope in crucial for a good understanding 
of the notion of inquiry that underlies its educational 
methodology.  
In a very interesting article entitled “Transcendental 
Hope: Peirce, Hookway, and Pihlström on the Conditions 
for Inquiry” (2005), Elizabeth Cooke shows how hope is 
a necessary condition for inquiry. She begins by showing 
how for, Charles Sanders Peirce, logic is based on the 
sentiments of faith, hope and charity (EP1:150, 1878) 
and that, “in inquiry, the role of hope is willingness 
to ask questions” (Cooke 2005, 663). Taken this way 
hope can be seen as a habit of openness, for it stands 
as an attitude of willingness to ask questions despite the 
lack of expectations (Cooke 2005, 664).  However, the 
willingness to ask question is not born out of nowhere but 
arises from the practice of dialogue with others, which is 
internally connected to the achievement of thinking and 
keeping dialogues with oneself. Thus Cooke describes, 
Asking questions is a linguistic habit. And when we 
develop these habits it is with the response of others 
in mind. Questions are directed to another person, 
either a hypothetical person, an actual person, an 
internalized person from one’s memory, or one’s 
future self. How one asks a question (to oneself, 
or another) is conditioned by one’s experience of 
asking actual questions and the responses one has 
received, in the same way Mead describes how an 
utterance acquires its meaning. When we learn to 
think through dialogue with other, the scope and 
content of the hope which we develop may be 
conditioned by the responses we received to our 
questions in the past. If our questions are ignored 
by those around us, or pursued with interest, or our 
ideas are entertained and imaginatively explored, 
then a corresponding attitude of hope develops, 
further conditioning the kinds of questions one 
entertains on one’s own. What is important is that 
the question is responded to—not necessarily with 
successful or correct answers (Cooke 2005, 669)
The previous description is amazingly a wonderful 
explanation of what goes on in the establishment of the 
community of inquirers in Philosophy for Children and 
how participants of a community of inquiry carry the 
community with them. The social sphere of constructing 
and maintaining hope allows us to reafﬁrm that when 
hope stands as a willingness to ask questions it appears 
as a condition of all thinking because it embodies how
the individual (implicitly) hopes that another will 
respond in one way rather than another, even if that 
other person is her other self. While there may be 
different content to our different hopes, all hopes 
have some minimal content in common, namely, 
that there is another to respond (Cooke 2005, 668). 
Therefore, hope is both a condition of inquiry and 
conditioned by the development of inquiry, for while 
hope stands as a condition to ask questions, hope also 
allows for more hope because asking questions and 
receiving responses reinforces the sentiment of hope. 
What this illustration shows is that the continual revision 
of emotional processes does not necessarily mean a 
modiﬁcation of valence in emotional evaluation (like in 
the case of seemingly negative emotions), but can also 
be the reinforcement of the emotional process at stake. 
That is, open-ended character of emotional processes 
does not necessarily mean openness to change but 
includes openness to the continual assertion of the value 
and meaning of an emotional process. Taken in this way 
we can see how Philosophy for Children embodies the 
necessary acquisition and maintenance of hope as a 
condition of inquiry. 
Hope for Future Research
When I started to write and collect material to write 
about this topic I found myself having too much material. 
Such that it seemed I had accepted to write a book on 
this subject. Honestly, I had no idea it would have been 
so productive and so full of insights and suggestions for 
future inquiry. As I organized the material and choose what 
was to be said and what was to be left aside I continually 
felt like I was leaving out some very important issues. 
Granted part of my motivation and justiﬁcation was that 
I wanted to highlight the open character of emotional 
experiences. The following suggestions for further 
research are a way to make justice to some of the many 
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crucial topics that appear in the intersection of Emotions, 
Feminism and Philosophy for Children.
For a more detailed account of how Philosophy for 
Children provides opportunities to talk about emotions it 
would be very interesting to identify all possible emotional 
episodes and situations presented in the novels plus 
their material in the manuals (exercises and discussion 
plans) and examples of how they have been taken up 
in communities of inquiry (it would be an interesting 
starting point to compare different cultural reactions to 
emotional situations of the novels).  In addition, it should 
be further investigated how the practice of Philosophy for 
Children cultivates trust, self-esteem, and empathy given 
the recent development of research on emotions. Also, 
emotional process seems a good place to delineate the 
attitude of the facilitator in the community of inquirers, 
for emotional development is an on going achievement 
and consequently an excellent way for the facilitator to 
test her genuine participation as a facilitator. 
Finally, Caring thinking has long been a topic of 
Philosophy for Children and it would be very interesting 
to analyze the connections between Lipman’s insights 
about caring thinking and the recent developments of 
emotion research.
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Footnotes
1 The research and writing of this paper is supported 
by a post-doc fellowship [BPD/14175/2003] granted by 
Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, and is part of a 
research project “Emotion, Cognition and Communication” 
[POCTI/FIL/58227/2004] of Instituto de Filosoﬁa da 
Linguagem. I would like to thank Ann Sharp for keeping 
me in her memory, and for suggesting and challenging me 
to write on these issues.
2 In this paper I refer only to use of natural languages, 
but there is a very important issue of how language of the 
arts in general and other forms of communication that 
either are used with natural languages or on its own (tone of 
voice, facial expression, body language, etc) is connected to 
emotional literacy and emotional growth.  
3Newirth argues in his book  Between Emotion and 
Cognition. The Generative Unconscious. He writes, “I 
have argued against the analytic injunction to make the 
unconscious conscious and have rather presented a neo-
Kleinian argument for making consciousness unconscious. 
My paradoxical playing with Freud’s famous statement is 
an attempt to rethink the linked concepts of consciousness 
and unconsciousness, subjectivity and objectivity, reality 
and fantasy, and the paranoid-schizoid and depressive 
modes of experience. …. It is the development of this 
active capacity for the creation of meaning … that I have 
thought of as the subject of the unconscious, as each 
participant in the psychoanalytic dialogue attempts to speak 
from his unconscious symbolic perspective, the generative 
unconscious.”  
